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Escaping Path Dependency:  
A Proposed Multi-Tiered Approach for the 
UN’s Peacebuilding Commission
Necla Tschirgi 
Preface  From the Project Director 
At the 2005 World Summit in New York City, member states of the 
United Nations agreed to create “a dedicated institutional mechanism 
to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict to-
wards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in 
laying the foundation for sustainable development”. That new mecha-
nism was the UN Peacebuilding Commission and two associated bod-
ies: a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund. To-
gether, these new entities have been characterized as the UN’s new 
peacebuilding architecture, or PBA. 
 
This Working Paper is one of nine essays that examine the possible 
future role of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. They were written 
as part of a project co-organized by the Centre for International Policy 
Studies at the University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. All of the contributors to the project were asked 
to identify realistic but ambitious “stretch targets” for the Peacebuild-
ing Commission and its associated bodies over the next five to ten 
years. The resulting Working Papers, including this one, seek to 
stimulate fresh thinking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding.  
 
The moment is ripe for such rethinking: During 2010, the UN will re-
view the performance of the PBA to date, including the question of 
whether it has achieved its mandated objectives. Most of the contribu-
tors to this project believe that the PBA should pursue a more ambi-
tious agenda over the next five years. While the PBC and its associ-
ated bodies have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves, that 
niche remains a small one. Yet the need for more focused international 
attention, expertise, and coordinated and sustained assistance towards 
war-torn countries is undiminished. It remains to be seen whether UN 
officials and the organization’s member states will rise to the chal-
lenge of delivering on the PBA’s initial promise over the next five 
years and beyond, but doing so will at least require a vision of what 
the PBA can potentially accomplish in this period. The Working  
Papers produced in this project are intended to provide grist for this 
visioning effort. 
 
Roland Paris 
Ottawa, January 2010 
Summary 
The UN’s new peacebuilding architecture was created to address the 
persistent shortcomings of international support to countries emerging 
from war and violent conflict. Recognizing that peacebuilding is a 
multi-dimensional effort involving myriad actors, it was envisaged 
that the Peacebuilding Commission (and the related Peacebuilding 
Fund and Peacebuilding Support Office) would serve as catalysts to 
improve international policies and practices, thereby contributing to 
sustainable peace. 
 
While the PBC is now well-established, its performance to date has 
fallen short of expectations. One of the main reasons is the PBC’s pur-
suit of a ‘standard approach’ in its engagement with countries on its 
agenda. Every peacebuilding context is unique. Yet the PBC has so far 
been ‘path dependent’  replicating the same approach in successive 
countries. Its efforts have been driven by process rather than sub-
stance. 
 
This paper argues that unless the PBC adopts a ‘multi-tiered ap-
proach’ which is designed to better identify and respond to multiple 
peacebuilding challenges, it will remain a marginal actor in an already 
overcrowded peacebuilding field. A multi-tiered approach would re-
quire the PBC to define three existential questions regarding the  
scope, focus and function of its work. The Commission needs to en-
gage with a range of countries at different points on the non-linear 
transition from conflict to peace; it needs to focus on peacebuilding 
outcomes and impact rather than activities and inputs; and finally, it 
needs to establish itself as a proactive and sought out advisory body. 
These are consistent with the PBC’s formal mandate. However, they 
do necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the PBC’s current configu-
rations, instruments, and modes of operation. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the last two decades, there has been a growing understanding of the 
complex challenges of building peace in conflict-affected areas as 
well as the shortcomings of international efforts to support post-
conflict peacebuilding. As a result, there have been many efforts to 
improve peacebuilding assistance through new policies, practices and 
institutional reforms. Among these, the creation of the UN’s new  
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peacebuilding architecture merits special attention since it was de-
signed to fill a major gap in the international system. Consisting of the 
PBC, the PBF and the PBSO, the UN’s peacebuilding architecture has 
now been in operation for three years and has inevitably changed the 
UN’s landscape in various ways. However, there is an acute aware-
ness that the peacebuilding architecture – especially its main pillar the 
PBC – has fallen short of addressing the challenges that continue to 
beset international support for peacebuilding. Having invested in the 
creation of the new architecture, there is a legitimate concern among 
its many supporters that the PBC has yet to become an effective player 
in peacebuilding. The forthcoming 2010 review of the PBC provides 
an important opportunity to assess the extent to which the PBC has 
achieved its original objectives and how it can best chart a more effec-
tive course for the future.  
 
This briefing paper1 aims to contribute to that effort. Informed by 
close observation of the PBC’s work in the last three years, it presents 
a friendly critique of the PBC’s operations to date and offers some 
suggestions for its future.2 As other papers in this collection provide 
detailed accounts of the creation and evolution of the PBC, this one 
starts with a quick overview of the reasons that led to the PBC’s crea-
tion and a general assessment of the extent to which the PBC met the 
expectations of its creators. Arguing that the Commission’s work to 
date reflects a strong tendency toward path dependency, the paper  
urges the PBC to adopt a multi-tiered approach to supporting peace-
building in order to meet the complex and differentiated challenges 
facing countries emerging from conflict.  
 
 
 
I.  A Quick Review 
The UN’s peacebuilding architecture was created to redress the recog-
nized shortcomings of international efforts to support the complex and 
simultaneous humanitarian-security-development needs of countries 
emerging from conflict. These shortcomings are well known and have 
been convincingly detailed in the rich peacebuilding literature that 
was produced in the last fifteen years.3 Yet, despite much knowledge 
and innovative institutional reform, international peacebuilding re-
                                                 
1  This paper draws liberally from the extant literature on peacebuilding and the UN’s 
peacebuilding architecture.  However, it is also based on the author’s two year tenure at 
PBSO as an in-house consultant, serving as a Senior Policy Advisor. 
2  From 2001 to 2005, the author was Vice President of the International Peace Academy 
(now the IPI) in which capacity she advocated strongly for the creation of the PBC.  
3  For a useful survey of the field and the relevant literature, see  
www.peacebuildinginitiative.org 
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mains a highly problematic enterprise  as evidenced by the continu-
ing production of new reports detailing persisting problems and obsta-
cles.4 Paradoxically, one of the obstacles to the advancement of 
peacebuilding has been the steady influx of new-comers who end up 
re-discovering the field anew rather than moving the agenda forward. 
As a result, peacebuilding has become a field of self-perpetuating 
concepts and principles rather than their application and impact eva-
luation in concrete contexts with a view to advancing peacebuilding 
policy and practice.5 Indeed, the UN’s peacebuilding architecture was 
created for that very reason.  
 
Given the rich literature on the origins and antecedents of the UN’s 
peacebuilding architecture, I will not cover that ground anew. Instead, 
I believe that there is sufficient agreement on why we needed a new 
set of institutions at the United Nations. The aim was to redress the 
fragmented, piecemeal, erratic nature of international support to  
peacebuilding by creating a set of institutions with the explicit man-
date to overcome these weaknesses. In a nutshell, the PBC (and by 
extension, the PBF and PBSO) were designed to  
 
 bring sustained attention to the pressing needs of countries 
emerging from conflict;  
 promote better coordination and coherence among the myriad 
actors involved in peacebuilding;  
 marshal resources for peacebuilding; and  
 increase the knowledge base for more effective peacebuilding 
policy and practice.6 
 
To what extent has the PBC succeeded in meeting these expectations? 
More importantly, what does its record to date suggest about its future 
prospects and promises? The next two sections specifically address 
these questions. It should be noted that while the UN’s new peace-
building architecture also includes the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and 
the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), this paper focuses primar-
ily on the PBC. It is recognized that any consideration of the PBC’s 
performance is incomplete without adequate attention to these two  
related entities. Thus, the analysis in this paper needs to be linked to 
parallel discussions about strengthening the PBF and the PBSO.  
  
                                                 
4  See, for example, “Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate 
Aftermath of Conflict,” UN document A/63/881–S/2009/304 (11 June 2009): 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/367/70/PDF/N0936770.pdf 
5  It is for this reason that the Peacebuilding Roundtable held in Ottawa in December 2008 
proposed putting a moratorium on certain types of research and analysis so that we can 
more effectively contribute to improved policy and practice.5  
6  The founding resolutions of the PBC are also available at 
www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding 
Escaping Path Dependency 7 
II.  An Inauspicious Beginning:  
Process Trumps Substance 
As one of the two main institutional reforms to emerge from the 2005 
World Summit (the other being the Human Rights Council), the PBC 
started its work with great expectations but without a road map or a 
practical guidebook. Initially, it was primarily concerned with estab-
lishing itself and finding its niche within the UN labyrinth. Gradually, 
like other UN entities, it adopted a set of procedures and made a num-
ber of critical choices which have continued to shape its operations. In 
a nutshell, the PBC organized its work into three distinct configura-
tions: 1) the Organizational Committee (OC); 2) the Country-Specific 
Meetings (CSMs); and 3) the Working Group on Lessons Learned 
(WGLL). Collectively, these three configurations were designed to 
advance the PBC’s objectives. In reality, they have proceeded on 
separate tracks. The OC spent its first year primarily on procedural 
issues. Since then, it has held meetings on a number of policy issues 
ranging from the role of the private sector in peacebuilding to peace 
consolidation.7 Meanwhile, the WGLL organized more than twenty 
informal sessions on a wide range of topics.8 The core of the PBC’s 
work, however, has been concentrated in the CSMs, focusing first on 
Sierra Leone and Burundi, and more recently on Guinea-Bissau and 
the Central African Republic.9  
 
As required by its founding resolutions, the PBC has so far prepared 
three annual reports for the Security Council and the General Assem-
bly. These provide a formal record of the PBC’s activities and 
achievements. In addition, there have been several external reviews of 
the PBC.10 While identifying a number of shortcomings, these exter-
nal reviews have generally given the PBC the benefit of the doubt in 
terms of its effectiveness on the grounds that it is premature to make 
firm judgments about its performance and potential in light of its short 
tenure. Yet, to date, there has not been a formal and independent eva-
luation of the PBC.11 In 2010, five years after its creation, the PBC is 
                                                 
7  For a chronology and review of the OC’s work, see the PBC’s three annual reports on the 
PBC website. 
8  Ibid. In specific, see the Synthesis Report of the work of the PBC prepared by PBSO in 
June 2008 and the Chair’s Summary of the WGLL review meeting held on 9 December 
2009.  
9  For the extensive documentation of the PBC’s engagement with the four countries, see the 
PBC website under each configuration. 
10  See for example, NYU Center on International Cooperation and the International Peace 
Institute, “Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding 
Commission”, April 2008  
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/takingstocklookingforward.pdf 
11  In the meantime, there have been internal and external evaluations of the PBF leading to a 
formal revision of the terms of reference of the PBF. This suggests that there is more de-
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undertaking a “strategic review” of its work. However, unless it is un-
dertaken by an external body to provide an independent evaluation, 
the strategic review is likely to be fairly circumscribed in its scope and 
ambition.  
 
In the absence of a formal evaluation, any assessment of the PBC’s 
performance should be considered incomplete, partial and subjective. 
Nonetheless, after three years, there is a growing understanding of 
how the PBC is unfolding and what this might mean for its future. I 
believe that it is important to try to address three interrelated questions 
regarding the PBC’s role and performance so far:  
 
1. How do other critical actors view the role of the PBC?  
2. How has the PBC carried out its responsibilities?  
3. What is the link between the PBC’s work and peacebuilding 
outcomes on the ground?  
 
Admittedly, the answers that are offered below were not obtained 
through a systematic and rigorous evaluation process but through di-
rect personal knowledge of the PBC’s operations, interviews with nu-
merous stakeholders, and careful reading of relevant documents as 
well as the larger peacebuilding literature. 
Perception of the PBC by other actors 
There are numerous signs suggesting that the PBC has yet to become a 
significant player in peacebuilding. For one thing, the Commission is 
little known beyond its own immediate constituencies. Apart from 
people who are directly involved in the work of the PBC in UN head-
quarters or abroad, there is very little knowledge or understanding of 
the work of the PBC in capitals, among local peacebuilding practitio-
ners and the public at large.12 Even among the larger peacebuilding 
community, PBC is conspicuous by its absence. Besides its lack of a 
strong and visible profile (which is acknowledged in the PBC’s own 
reports), there is evidence that the PBC’s role is not acknowledged or 
sought after even by key constituencies. Three recent examples serve 
to confirm this: 
 
 The recently-released New Horizons report by the Departments 
of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support makes no refer-
ence to the PBC even though the report views peacebuilding as 
a critical dimension of the UN’s work. The omission of any re-
                                                 
mand for formal evaluations of funding mechanisms rather than of political processes 
which can have more impact on peacebuilding outcomes.  
12  During my extensive travels related to peacebuilding, I regularly ask local officials, aca-
demics, civil society organizations about the PBC. More often than not, they admit no 
knowledge of it.  
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ference to the PBC (or PBSO) in a UN report discussing  
peacebuilding is extremely telling.13  
 
 Equally significant, there has not been a strong demand from 
post-conflict countries for PBC’s assistance. Although more 
than two dozen countries struggle with serious peacebuilding 
challenges, PBC finds itself focusing only on four countries. 
So far, potential PBC candidate countries (e.g. Liberia) have 
declined proposals for PBC engagement. Meanwhile, some na-
tional and international officials from the first two countries on 
the PBC’s agenda seem anxious to initiate a process of disen-
gagement. 
 
 Turning to the UN system’s reception of the new peacebuild-
ing architecture, perhaps the most striking indication emerged 
during the preparation of the Secretary-General’s recent report 
on “Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict”. 
The months’ long report-preparation process displayed intense 
competition among the various UN entities for the lead role in 
peacebuilding and strong resistance to assigning a special role 
to the new “peacebuilding architecture” beyond countries on 
the PBC’s agenda and/or receiving PBF funding. Many parts 
of the UN system still consider the new “architecture” as one 
among other entities and, in fact, take issue with the suggestion 
that the PBC/PBF/PBSO have a broad mandate that is not con-
fined to a few countries.  
PBC’s view of its role and responsibilities 
Since its inception, the PBC has sought to define its role and functions 
through its various configurations and activities. However, there is no 
consensus or clarity on what these involve. In fact, there has been a 
running debate among the PBC member states as to the proper role of 
the PBC: Should it focus exclusively on particular countries or should 
it take on a larger advisory role? Should it be proactive or respond to 
incoming requests? These questions have been raised repeatedly and 
never resolved satisfactorily.14 Instead, the PBC seems to have fallen 
into a safe routine, a “path dependency”  replicating its approach in 
                                                 
13  Annex 1 of the New Horizons report which summarizes its recommendation, also makes 
no mention of the PBSO, stating: “ To contribute to a broader peacebuilding effort, 
DPKO and DFS will: 
•  Develop a coherent strategy for sequencing, resourcing and implementing mandated 
early safety and security stabilization tasks. 
•  “Request missions, as relevant, to include information on progress in peacebuilding in 
their regular assessments on mandated tasks, as well as on related actions of UN agen-
cies, funds and programmes and other partners, and to collectively draw attention to 
critical gaps.” p. 42. 
14  See, for example, the minutes of the PBC’s two retreats to date. 
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each new country with little variation.15 Moreover, PBC has embraced 
the time-honored UN tradition of holding an ever-increasing number 
of meetings with few concrete results. As a result, the Commission’s 
approach has cast doubts on its ability to serve as an innovative actor 
that can bring novel and multi-dimensional perspectives to peace-
building. Several examples demonstrate the PBC’s shortcomings in 
this regard. 
 
 Many analysts and advocates saw the PBC’s unique composi-
tion and diverse constituency as a hopeful sign  suggesting 
that the PBC would be able to overcome UN’s conventional 
practices, including competition within regional groupings for 
membership on UN bodies, in pursuing its mandate. However, 
intense competition within GRULAC states for PBC member-
ship during the Commission’s very first rotation of members in 
June 2008 and the resultant postponement of the turn-over of 
PBC membership suggested that the PBC is highly susceptible 
to member state politics to the extent of disrupting the Com-
mission’s work.  
 
 While member states compete vigorously for PBC member-
ship, their performance does not reflect a similar level of 
commitment to its work. Although the Commission has held 
many meetings, undertook various field missions, and produ-
ced numerous reports, these were largely due to the initiative 
of a relatively small number of member states (mainly donor 
countries) who also took on heavy responsibilities as chairs of 
the various configurations of the PBC. Other states have re-
mained passive members of the PBC  generally following the 
lead of the few activist members. Indeed, with the exception of 
countries chairing the PBC’s various configurations, there is 
scant evidence that PBC member states have assumed addi-
tional financial or political responsibilities as part of their 
membership on the PBC. 
 
 Perhaps one of the most telling signs of the disconnect be-
tween the PBC’s internal processes and the needs of its poten-
tial clients is the time it takes for the PBC to respond to incom-
ing requests. In the case of Sierra Leone and Burundi, there 
was a long lag time between their referral to the PBC and the 
completion of their IPBSes which defined the relationship 
between the PBC and the country in question. This was largely 
due to the fact that the PBC was only just getting started and 
                                                 
15  The term “path dependence” is used to explain how decisions taken in any given circum-
stance are limited by previous decisions, even when past circumstances may no longer be 
relevant. 
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defining its role. However, both Guinea-Bissau and the Central 
African Republic had to wait over a year before their formal 
request was relayed to the PBC via the Secretary-General and 
the Security Council and the PBC finally became engaged with 
the two countries. In the meantime, there was little sense of 
urgency or proactive advocacy on the part of the PBC. Given 
the oft-repeated dictum that the narrow “window of opportuni-
ty” in post-conflict contexts should not be wasted, these delays 
reflect the shortcomings of the PBC’s institutional arrange-
ments which militate against quick and effective action.  
Link between the PBC’s work and peacebuilding outcomes  
While external perceptions and internal operations matter, ultimately 
the PBC’s performance has to be seen in light of its contributions to 
improving peacebuilding outcomes on the ground. In the absence of a 
formal evaluation, any assessment is inevitably impressionistic and 
subjective. It is also inconclusive since it is extremely difficult to at-
tribute causality or responsibility to any single actor in a complex and 
multi-faceted field such as peacebuilding. However, several indicators 
suggest that the PBC’s work has at best been modest, if not marginal 
in all its configurations. Both the Organizational Committee and the 
Working Group on Lessons Learned have held many meetings on im-
portant issues, but these have essentially been inconsequential in terms 
of leading to new policies, strategies or action. There is no evidence 
that peacebuilding policy or practice at the United Nations or beyond 
has been influenced by the deliberations of the OC or the WGLL.16  
 
More seriously, however, the work of the CSMs has also been quite 
modest  certainly in relation to the time, energy and resources that 
have been devoted to the PBC. This is not to minimize the PBC’s ef-
forts; it is simply to put them in perspective in light of the enormous 
needs that remain to be met. Here, again, several examples offer a use-
ful reality check: 
 
 There is no evidence that the two countries where the PBC was 
involved for the last three years (Sierra Leone and Burundi) 
have fared better than other countries (such as Liberia or 
Rwanda) where the PBC was not involved.  
 
 While analysts recognize the PBC’s positive contributions at 
certain critical moments in both Sierra Leone and Burundi, it is 
difficult to assert that the PBC’s role was essential or indispen-
sable – especially since there were already integrated UN mis-
                                                 
16  See the synthesis report of the WGLL’s proceedings prepared in June 2008 and December 
2009.  
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sions in both Sierra Leone and Burundi with the specific man-
date to bring a coherent and strategic approach to peacebuild-
ing in each country. On the other hand, there is evidence that 
the PBC’s extensive engagement in these countries generated 
new tensions and considerable additional work for the national 
and international actors on the ground.  
 
 Perhaps most serious of all, violence erupted repeatedly in one 
of the countries under the PBC’s watch and PBC was largely a 
bystander in the process. The PBC’s own report on its engage-
ment in Guinea-Bissau is a revealing testimony of the PBC’s 
limitations. Paragraphs 45-53 of the PBC’s third annual report 
deal with Guinea-Bissau, primarily describing procedural mat-
ters and various activities. In between, three paragraphs make 
a reference to a) an armed attack on the residence of President 
Vieira; b) the assassinations of the President and his Chief of 
General Staff; c) the assassination of a former Minister and 
presidential candidate. In each of these cases, the PBC’s re-
sponse is described as expressing concern, condemning the use 
of violence and reiterating support in favor of peacebuilding 
efforts.17 There is little reflection on the implications of these 
violent events on the PBC’s engagement with Guinea-Bissau 
or even any sense of urgency about the need for a different 
course of action.  
 
Indeed, the Guinea-Bissau case captures the most serious shortcoming 
of the PBC. There seems to be a deep gap (as well as cognitive disso-
nance) between the PBC’s intensive and lengthy processes and reali-
ties on the ground. This is true for the PBC’s country configurations 
as well as its Organizational Committee and the Working Group on 
Lessons Learned. Process repeatedly seems to trump substance.  
 
It is recognized that the PBC is a new entity; that for an advisory UN 
body, its work is just gaining momentum; that it first needed to estab-
lish its processes in order start delivering on its promise; that it is only 
one player among many that are engaged in peacebuilding. All of this 
is true. And there are various short-term proposals for improving the 
PBC’s operations which should be embraced and implemented as 
soon as possible. However, this paper argues that if the PB architec-
ture proceeds in its current path with only marginal fine-tuning or in-
cremental change, it will fail to realize the worthy goals for which it 
was created, namely, to help improve peacebuilding policy and prac-
tice in countries emerging from conflict. It is not too soon to start ask-
                                                 
17  See the third annual report of the PBC at 
ww.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=PBC/3/OC/L.1 
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ing the hard questions about the PBC’s long-term future if it is even-
tually going to get there. 
 
 
 
III.  Moving the Agenda Forward:  
A Multi-Tiered Role for the PBC 
As the 2010 review of the PBC approaches, the PBC needs to confront 
several existential questions about the scope, focus and nature of its 
work. Without a serious re-examination of these fundamental issues, 
the PBC  and the UN’s peacebuilding architecture  risk becoming a 
marginal player among the myriad actors engaged in peacebuilding 
rather than the much-needed catalyst and innovator envisaged by its 
supporters and creators. None of the following questions is new. As 
noted, they have all been raised by the PBC as well as various analysts 
and have generated considerable debate.18 However, they all remain 
pending: 
 
1. Should the PBC confine its work primarily to post-
peacekeeping cases or should it engage earlier in conflict con-
texts where there is an opportunity to promote peacebuilding 
alongside peacemaking and peacekeeping? 
 
2. Should the PBC have a limited, country-specific role or a 
broader peacebuilding role? 
 
3. What is an appropriate role for a UN subsidiary advisory body 
that reports both to the Security Council and the General  
Assembly? What are the boundaries of an advisory role? As a 
UN body representing diverse constituencies, can the PBC be 
empowered to serve as an overseer of internationally-agreed 
standards and policies?  
 
There are multiple possible responses to each question ranging from a 
minimalist to a maximalist vision. Inevitably, different choices have 
fundamentally different implications for the long-term effectiveness of 
the PBC. They also carry different operational implications, with 
varying degrees of feasibility. However, in lieu of addressing each 
question individually, this paper argues that they should be addressed 
jointly. Only by examining their necessary inter-dependence can we 
                                                 
18  See the minutes of the PBC’s two annual retreats as well as the June 2009 Stanley Foun-
dation conference report at  
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/PeacebulidingRpt809.pdf 
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begin to visualize how best they can be incorporated into the work of 
the UN’s peacebuilding architecture in the coming 3-5 years. What 
follows, therefore, is an attempt to envisage a PBC that can realize its 
full potential as an indispensable actor whose role and contributions in 
peacebuilding are recognized, sought after and, most importantly, 
consequential in terms of improving peacebuilding policy, practice 
and outcomes.  
 
The options outlined below are congruent with the PBC’s original 
mandate and do not depend on radical changes requiring another 
round of extensive intergovernmental or inter-departmental negotia-
tions. Thus, the purpose of this exercise is to identify ways of making 
the current peacebuilding architecture more effective rather that creat-
ing a different architecture that would further detract attention and re-
sources from the overall goal of improving peacebuilding outcomes.  
1. Scope of the PBC’s Work: Situating the PBC within the 
Non-linear Conflict to Peace Continuum  
It has become axiomatic that in most intra-state conflicts (which are 
the core of international peacebuilding efforts) there is a conflict cycle 
that cannot easily be divided into identifiable phases such as pre-
conflict, in-conflict or post-conflict. Similarly, it is recognized that 
international responses in terms of humanitarian aid, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding cannot be provided in a sequential 
manner but often need to be provided simultaneously.19 Nonetheless, 
so far the PBC has only focused on late post-conflict, post-
peacekeeping contexts. Moreover, all the cases on the PBC’s portfolio 
come from Africa and are countries that are not high on the interna-
tional agenda. 
 
While it might have been necessary to limit PBC’s early work to rela-
tively “easier” post-peacekeeping countries, that decision is no longer 
defensible in light of the fact that in most cases peacebuilding cannot 
be postponed until after the peacekeepers have left. If the PBC does 
not get involved in “hard” cases where peacemaking, peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding are often co-terminus, it is likely that the PBC will 
steadily be marginalized and weakened vis-à-vis its relations with the 
Security Council and other international actors involved in conflict 
contexts. The question is not simply a sequential division of labor be-
tween the Security Council and the PBC. Indeed, the Security Council 
is still involved in the four cases on the PBC’s agenda. The question is 
more about their respective areas of competence. The PBC needs to 
demonstrate its special competence and value-added in supporting 
                                                 
19  See “United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines” (or the so-called Cap-
stone doctrine) on the DPKO website.  
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peacebuilding in a range of different contexts. The PBC’s mandate is 
multi-faceted and distinct from the Security Council’s focus on main-
taining peace and security. It is also different from the mandates of 
other relevant actors such as donors, IFIs and NGOs which are primar-
ily concerned with longer term development. The PBC is the desig-
nated intergovernmental body where security-diplomacy-development 
come together. It is also the only international body that can bring na-
tional, regional and international actors together to address the multi-
faceted challenges of peacebuilding in different contexts.  
 
Moving from its current late post-conflict case load to engage in con-
flict-torn countries with a peacekeeping mission would require a radi-
cal re-tooling of the PBC as well as a better delineation of its role vis-
à-vis the Security Council. In specific, the PBC would require better 
and more rigorous analysis of opportunities and options for effective 
peacebuilding in a wider range of countries. It would also need to  
organize itself differently in order to develop greater expertise and 
knowledge that would enable it to provide relevant advice to the Secu-
rity Council.20 At the moment, it is unlikely that the Security Council 
would bring “hard cases” like the DRC, Afghanistan or Iraq to the at-
tention of the PBC even though it is recognized that these countries 
are struggling with difficult peacebuilding challenges alongside ongo-
ing military and security problems. It is only when and if the PBC can 
demonstrate its ability to contribute something ‘indispensable” to the 
work of the Security Council (and other relevant actors) that it would 
be taken more seriously.  
2. Focus of the PBC’s Work: Aiming for Peacebuilding Out-
comes and Impact 
If the PBC is to get involved in a wide range of conflict contexts to 
promote peacebuilding earlier rather than later in the messy transition 
from war to peace, it cannot proceed with its current focus on only a 
few countries to the exclusion of others where its intervention might, 
in fact, be more necessary. This means that the PBC has to conceive 
of its role more broadly and consider its engagement on multiple lev-
els. It can continue to engage with relatively “safe”, late post conflict 
case like Sierra Leone or Burundi or countries facing chronic insecu-
rity and instability like Guinea-Bissau. However, it also needs to as-
sume responsibility in other cases where there is a clear need for a 
non-partisan multilateral entity to bring knowledge, political influ-
ence, convening power and resources to address difficult challenges to 
peacebuilding. 
 
                                                 
20  In this connection, the role of the PBSO in supporting the PBC to take on expanded re-
sponsibilities is essential. 
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However, expanding its portfolio means that the PBC needs to adopt a 
differentiated and tailored strategy requiring varying levels of en-
gagement with the countries on its agenda  i.e. a so-called “multi-
tier” approach. The Commission cannot proceed with its current stan-
dardized and path-dependent approach consisting of the development 
of an IPBS, periodic reviews and meeting-heavy procedures. Instead, 
the specific role and value-added of the PBC will have to depend upon 
the context which, after all, should be the starting point of any effec-
tive peacebuilding strategy. In some cases, PBC’s help might be 
needed to overcome specific blockages in how the international com-
munity provides assistance in a given country. In such cases, the 
PBC’s role would be as a facilitator or even a neutral “third party.” In 
other cases, the PBC might facilitate a regional approach to peace-
building involving several neighboring countries. Indeed, the regional 
dimension of contemporary conflicts is well-recognized although very 
few organizations currently have regional strategies.21 In still other 
cases, the PBC might play the key role in supporting a government to 
develop an integrated peacebuilding strategy when there are no na-
tional planning frameworks or effective UN presence on the ground. 
In order to respond to these diverse needs, the PBC would need to or-
ganize itself into new configurations and develop a new range of in-
struments besides the current IPBS to help shape its engagement in 
different context. In fact, there is growing appreciation within the PBC 
of the limitations of the current IPBS process and product. Beyond 
formal tools and instruments, the PBC also needs to re-consider its 
current configurations. In addition to some variation of the CSMs, the 
PBC might have other standing or provisional mechanisms such as 
“Groups of Friends” or “Special Observers” to undertake specific 
tasks and functions. 
 
Equally important, PBC support need not be confined to country-
specific challenges. Instead, the PBC needs to take on systemic, policy 
or institutional issues that are often the main blockages to peacebuild-
ing in conflict-prone countries. These might include observing the im-
plementation of agreed international cooperation frameworks across 
various countries; working with other actors to establish policy guide-
lines and standards for resource mobilization, including the operation 
of the PBF and multi-donor trust funds for peacebuilding; reviewing 
and helping to synchronize UN’s diverse sectoral policies in post-
conflict contexts; and identifying institutional impediments to effec-
tive collaboration. In each of these cases, PBC’s help would be di-
rected to serving as a catalyst or facilitator to bring myriad actors to 
                                                 
21  For regional approaches to peacebuilding, see the WGLL’s discussion of the topic on 
several occasions. For an African perspective, see the parallel Briefing Paper by Kwesi 
Aning and Ernest Ansah Lartey.  
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identify a solution to common problems across geographic, national or 
institutional boundaries.  
 
For example, the Secretary-General’s report on “Peacebuilding in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict” has identified a number of areas 
where the UN as well as the international community need to make 
significant changes in the way they respond to peacebuilding in the 
immediate aftermath of war. There is no other entity than the Peace-
building Commission with the mandate to oversee that these changes 
are undertaken. While the PBC does not have an enforcement man-
date, it has the delegated authority to review, assess and advise how 
the international community is living up to its responsibilities in the 
area of peacebuilding. However, as with all the other tasks identified 
above, taking on such a role would require a significant re-thinking of 
PBC’s current internal organization.  
 
So far the PBC has concentrated its work primarily on its country-
specific configurations (CSMs) while the Organizational Committee 
and the Working Group on Lessons Learned have examined assorted 
thematic or policy issues largely in isolation from the work of the 
CSMs and with little concern for their utility or practical application. 
Indeed, the CSMs have generally convened their own thematic ses-
sions instead of taking advantage of the OC or the WGLL as useful 
platforms. As a result, there has been very little accumulation of 
knowledge or cross-fertilization among the PBC’s three configura-
tions. The lack of synergy among the PBC’s three configurations is 
well recognized although efforts to overcome this have not yielded 
any results.22 This is largely because, in the absence of a clear idea 
about their mutual interdependence, each group has proceeded on se-
parate tracks. A differentiated and multi-tiered approach to its work 
would require the PBC to organize itself differently in order to ensure 
that all its configurations contribute actively to strengthening the 
PBC’s knowledge and expertise in different areas. The PBC’s current 
configurations provide a useful model for considering how best to  
organize the Commission’s roughly three dozen member states and 
other participating entities to take on additional roles through an effec-
tive division of labor. 
3. PBC’s Institutional Role and Functions: Becoming a Pro-
active and Sought-out Advisor  
The previous discussion about the scope and the nature of the PBC’s 
work also requires a significant re-formulation of the PBC’s relations 
with other key actors, and especially the Security Council and the 
                                                 
22  See, for example, the concept note and the Chair’s summaries of the WGLL meetings of 
12 June 2008 and 9 December 2009.  
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General Assembly. As a June 2009 report by the Stanley Foundation 
notes:  
 
Overall, there seemed to be two visions for the PBC: (1) a body that comple-
ments the work of other UN organs and agencies, and many other internatio-
nal actors, by filling the much-needed role of a flexible and fast provider of 
peace dividends in the early recovery period; and (2) a body that more ambi-
tiously informs the Security Council of needs and potential crises at a strate-
gic level, mainstreams peacebuilding throughout the UN system, raises far 
more funds than is currently the case for peacebuilding needs, integrates 
peacebuilding with other existing “pillars” in the UN system (peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, development), and even acts as a top-down unifier of other 
global actors via the strategic peacebuilding plan produced by its own CSM 
mechanism. 23 
 
So far, the PBC has primarily played the former role  albeit in a lim-
ited capacity. There has not been strong support within the PBC to 
assume the second role. However, this expanded role was in fact the 
main rationale for the PBC’s creation. The PBC was not intended to 
be yet another actor in an already crowded-peacebuilding field. It was 
designed to bring sustained attention, knowledge, experience, re-
sources, expertise and, perhaps most important of all, rigorous advice 
and guidance on the multi-faceted and complex challenges of peace-
building faced by various actors in different contexts.  
 
It is true that the PBC was created as a subsidiary advisory body.  
However, the advisory role of an intergovernmental, multilateral body 
need not only be reactive  providing advice upon request. The PBC 
has the authority to define its advisory role in its various permutations. 
It can serve as an independent voice; a convener of diverse stake-
holders who bring their unique perspectives and contributions to 
peacebuilding; a watchdog or overseer of international policy and 
practice with a view to identifying problems and proposing corrective 
solutions; a solicitor of technical inputs from academics, experts and 
civil society groups, including commissioning rigorous evaluation 
studies as necessary; a repository of knowledge and information on a 
wide range of topics that are relevant to peacebuilding; a recognized 
body of expertise and experience whose advice/guidance is sought  
after; and not least of all, an effective advocate for more effective 
peacebuilding.  
 
These functions are consistent with the PBC’s advisory role. How-
ever, the PBC needs to grow into them through its own efforts with a 
view to establishing its credibility and utility for the Security Council, 
the General Assembly, and other key national and international actors. 
                                                 
23  “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” A Report of the Conference Organized by the 
Stanley Foundation on 19-21 June 2009  
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/PeacebulidingRpt809.pdf 
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This would require the PBC to increase its capacities and knowledge 
base through a significantly strengthened PBSO as well as stronger 
relations with other knowledge-based and policy-oriented institutions 
such as think tanks, universities, the OECD-DAC, practitioners net-
works, and civil society organizations  especially in conflict-affected 
countries As covered by other contributions in this series, there are 
already various elements of such a “virtual” knowledge network in 
place, including the UN Peacebuilding Community of Practice (PB 
CoP) and the PBSO/HPCR-supported Peacebuilding Initiative, 
www.peacebuildinginitiative.com.24 Recognizing its own catalytic 
role and resource limitations, the PBC needs to draw extensively upon 
the work of operational entities engaged in different aspects of peace-
building within as well as outside the United Nations. After all, nei-
ther the PBC nor the PBSO are operational actors. Ultimately, their 
work has to be informed by the individual and collective contributions 
of many national, regional and international actors to peacebuilding 
around the world. The PBC can best contribute to improved interna-
tional policy and practice by distilling relevant lessons from diverse 
experiences and serving as a repository of what works and what does 
not in peacebuilding. 
 
 
 
IV.  Conclusion and Next Steps 
The three-pronged and multi-tiered vision outlined above is not a far-
fetched fantasy. It is, in fact, eminently feasible provided there is suf-
ficient interest within the PBC to push its envelope or, alternatively, 
sufficient pressure on the PBC to do so. The 2010 review provides an 
ideal opportunity for the PBC, as well as friends of peacebuilding who 
continue to believe in the utility of the UN’s peacebuilding architec-
ture, to start discussing how this or alternative models can be ad-
vanced to ensure that the PBC lives up to its worthy goals.  
 
The UN’s peacebuilding architecture (including the PBC, the PBF and 
the PBSO) are still relatively new entities, seeking appropriate roles 
within the UN and the larger international community. Their internal 
organization, modes of operation and relationships are still sufficiently 
fluid as to allow significant change. Moreover, all three entities have 
already acquired considerable experience over the last three years 
which, in turn, has demonstrated their capacities and weaknesses. As 
already noted, there is a need for an independent, external evaluation 
                                                 
24  For a fuller discussion of this point, see the parallel Working Paper by Erin McCandless. 
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of the work of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture as the basis for any 
significant re-orientation.  
 
The PBC is at an important crossroads. It can continue in its current 
path with only minimal adjustments to the way it works with the seri-
ous likelihood that it will become yet another entity in an already 
overcrowded peacebuilding field. In that case, given its limited re-
sources and ambitions, it might well find itself as a peripheral append-
age to other bigger and more powerful actors such as the Security 
Council, donors, IFIs, regional organizations, and various operational 
actors in the field. Alternatively, it can re-visit its role and responsi-
bilities based on its experiences to date and decide that it is ready to 
take on an expanded agenda. In that event, it might find it useful to 
start by reviewing the range of ideas advanced by individuals who still 
believe in the original mandate of the PBC but feel that it has to make 
a serious course correction to become an effective entity.  
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